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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SANDRA PEARCE-MATO,
Plaintiff,
v
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
Secretary o f the Department o f Veterans' Affairs
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Pending now before the Court is DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, filed at Doc. No. 27. In support of the motion, Defendant has also filed an 
appendix (Doc. No. 28), concise statement of material facts (Doc. No. 29), and brief in support 
(Doc. No. 30). Plaintiff responded with the filing of PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 33), with brief in support 
(Doc. No. 34), response to Defendant’s concise statement of material facts (Doc. No. 35), 
Plaintiff’s own concise statement (Doc. No. 36), and appendix (Doc. No. 37). Defendant has 
responded to Plaintiff’s concise statement, and replied to Plaintiff’s brief (Doc. No. 38). The 
motion is now ripe for disposition.
Generally speaking, this is an employment discrimination action in which Plaintiff brings 
a claim for constructive discharge against her former employer, Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of 
the Department of Veterans Affairs, under the Rehabilitation Act (the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 
et seq. Plaintiff seeks back pay, front pay or reinstatement, and other monetary compensation. 
See Doc. No. 15, Amended Complaint.
)
)
)
) 2:10-cv-1029
)
)
)
)
)
)
The Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”) has filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing primarily that Plaintiff cannot satisfy theprimafacie case for discrimination 
because she was not “regarded as” disabled by her employer, and she was not qualified for the 
position she held at the time of her retirement. See Doc. No. 30. In the alternative, Defendant 
argues that, even if Plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie case, the VA has set forth a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions that resulted in her decision to retire when 
she did. Id.
For the following reasons, the VA’s motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Sandra Pearce-Mato was employed by the VA at the VA Medical Center in 
Butler, PA (“Butler VAMC”) as a full time employee from January 5, 1975 until she was 
medically terminated on October 10, 1990, and again from March 8, 1992, until she retired 
effective May 1, 2009. During her former period of employment from 1975 to 1990, Plaintiff 
worked as a nurse. She sustained a work related injury on December 28, 1988 when a patient 
kicked her in her lower and upper back. Between October 10, 1990 and her return to work at the 
Butler VAMC in 1992, Plaintiff collected worker’s compensation benefits.
Plaintiff returned to work at the Butler VAMC on March 8, 1992 as a Coding Clerk. 
Beginning on or about December 6, 2003, and continuing until on or about June 21, 2008, 
Plaintiff worked as a Medical Records Technician/Lead Scanner. Beginning on June 22, 2008, 
Plaintiff’s position became Clinical Applications Coordinator (“CAC”), a position she held until 
her retirement in 2009. The record indicates, however, that, despite the position/title change, she 
continued to work as a Medical Records Technician/Lead Scanner until October 12, 2008. As a
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CAC, Plaintiff’s first line supervisor was Nevada “Sue” Legacy, and her second line supervisor 
was Douglas George. There were three (3) CACs at the Butler VAMC during the relevant time 
period: Plaintiff, Carol Niggel, and Janice Martin, with Carol Niggel as Team Leader (although 
she did not supervise Plaintiff).
According to Plaintiff, she “lost [her] voice” for the first time in approximately May 
1984, and that her “[v]oice returned” on June 25, 1991. See Doc. No. 28-1, Plaintiffs Depo. at 
Tr. p. 30. This voice loss is apparently a result of mercury toxicity, a condition Plaintiff 
developed from having mercury fillings in her mouth for approximately fifteen cavities. During 
this period, Plaintiff described her voice as “hoarse and very low”, and that this condition was 
consistent throughout the seven year period. Id. at Tr. pp. 32-33. Plaintiff undertook speech 
therapy, which she also called voice therapy, “for a long periods of time” during this period, to 
no apparent avail. Id  at Tr. pp. 34-35. Beginning in the latter months of 1984, and continuing 
until she was medically terminated in December 1990, Plaintiff utilized an electrolarynx device 
while working, which is an electronic device that she would hold to the side of her neck that 
would vocalize sounds as she spoke. Plaintiff testified during her deposition that she began 
using the electrolarynx after a speech pathologist at the VA informed her about the device. She 
denied that she was required to ask any of her supervisors at the Butler VAMC if she could use 
to electrolarynx while working and she further testified that no supervisors ever objected to her 
use of the device. Id. at Tr. p. 39.
Following her return to work at the Butler VAMC, Plaintiff lost her voice intermittently 
between June 25, 1991, and October 15, 2008, testifying that, “Periodically throughout this 
whole time, I would lose my voice for a period of time, maybe a month, maybe less, but there 
was no problem.” Id. at Tr. pp. 40-41. Plaintiff contends that she lost her voice for a second
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extended period of time beginning on October 15, 2008, a loss which lasted until July 2009. 
Plaintiff started training on a full-time basis for the CAC position on October 12, 2008. She was 
trained by a retired Butler VAMC employee who had been asked to return to the facility in order 
to train her. According to Plaintiff, the trainer came to work on October 14, 2008, “with a very 
bad upper respiratory infection.” Id. at Tr. pp. 48-49. That evening, Plaintiff began to develop 
scratchiness and soreness in her throat, and she developed laryngitis the next day. She contacted 
her physician, Roy Kerry, M.D., on or about October 16, 2008, and was prescribed antibiotics.
She contacted Dr. Kerry once again on October 24, 2008, and scheduled an appointment 
to see him on November 4, 2008. After examining Plaintiff, Dr. Kerry noted the following 
impression: “She has slight vocal cord edema from excessive use. We’ll recommend that she 
have light duty, meaning that she can do her nursing duties with reduction of the amount of 
speech use required. Therefore, I would recommend that she be removed from the position of 
teaching and return to other nursing care that does not require the continuous use of her voice for 
a period of about 4 weeks.” Doc. No. 28-9, Med. Records form Dr. Kerry dtd. Nov. 4, 2008. As 
per that recommendation, Plaintiff was placed on light duty beginning on or about November 4, 
2008, although that duty entailed continuing to work as a CAC undergoing computer training.
Also at some point in late October, 2008, Plaintiff approached Team Leader Carol Niggel 
about using her electrolarynx. According to Plaintiff, she was told by Ms. Niggel that she “could 
not use one of those mechanical things (electrolarynx), and that I had to use my own voice.”
Doc. No. 28-1 at Tr. p. 43. At some point thereafter, Plaintiff asked her first line supervisor Sue 
Legacy about using an electrolarynx, also informing Legacy of Niggel’s response. According to 
Plaintiff, in response Ms. Legacy “just smiled and said ‘oh well’”. Id. Plaintiff interpreted this 
reaction from Legacy as an adoption of Niggel’s position that the use of the electrolarnyx was
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not permitted. Plaintiff submitted an Application for Promotion or Reassignment for the position 
of Supervisory Medical Records Technician, also known as Lead Coder, on December 8, 2008. 
Ultimately, Plaintiff was not selected for this position.
At the request of her employer, Plaintiff underwent a Fitness for Duty examination with 
Donald McGraw, M.D., on December 9, 2008. Dr. McGraw referred Plaintiff to Joseph Turner, 
M.D., an ear, nose, and throat specialist. Plaintiff was also away from work at the Butler VAMC 
on sick leave from December 17, 2008 until March 13, 2009 for surgery on her hand and wrist. 
The surgery resulted from an injury sustained on December 16, 2008, when Plaintiff slipped and 
fell on ice. On January 6, 2009, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Turner for a second Fitness for 
Duty examination, who then referred her to Priya Krishna, M.D., at the University of Pittsburgh 
Voice Center. Dr. Krishna conducted a Fitness for Duty examination, Plaintiff’s third such 
exam, on February 6, 2009. Dr. Krishna recommended that Plaintiff undergo voice therapy, and 
that she follow-up for a re-evaluation following completion of the therapy. Ultimately, Plaintiff 
did not undergo voice therapy because, according to her, she could not afford to pay for it, and 
her employer would not cover the expense.
Plaintiff returned to work during the week of March 13, 2009, and was placed on light 
duty assignment in the Business Office beginning on March 16, 2009. During this assignment, 
Plaintiff was no longer training for the CAC position; instead, she was doing general 
administrative work. At some point following the February 6, 2009, Fitness for Duty 
examination, Plaintiff met with Michelle Dominski, Butler VAMC Human Resources Officer, 
for the first time. It was during that meeting that Plaintiff contends she was informed that 
Defendant would not pay for voice therapy because it was not a work-related injury. Doc. No.
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28-1 at Tr. pp. 66-67. Not inconsistent with Plaintiff’s recall, Dominski described what occurred
during that first meeting in slightly greater detail:
During the meeting, [Plaintiff] indicated that she was not able to speak and was 
unsure as to if and/or when the situation would be resolved. We discussed the 
fact that she had undergone a fitness for duty, a referral to an ENT, and then a 
final referral to the Voice Center. We discussed the fact that the Voice Center 
recommended that she undergo voice therapy, as well as, follow up at the 
completion of voice therapy for re-evaluation. She stated that she was unwilling 
to undergo voice therapy as she had the same issue years ago and voice therapy 
didn’t help her problem. She stated that she had a follow up appointment 
scheduled with the Voice Center on April 6, 2009. At that time, she asked 
whether she was going to be fired. I explained that was a course of action that we 
could take, i.e., separation due to medical inability to perform the duties of her 
position and that in lieu of being separated she might want to think about 
disability retirement. Complainant indicated that she was eligible to retire and 
had already received an estimate from the HRMS Assistant who handles 
retirements. [Plaintiff] asked whether she would be terminated immediately or 
[if she] could go to her follow up appointment with the Voice Center on April 6,
2009. I told her [Plaintiff] that she would not be terminated immediately; we 
would reassess the situation after she underwent her follow up appointment with 
the Voice Center.
Doc. No. 28-8, Dominski ORM Affidavit, pp. 2-3.
Plaintiff was examined in the follow up appointment by Dr. Krishna on April 6, 2009.
Dr. Krishna was unable to determine Plaintiff’s fitness to return to work given the fact that she 
had not participated in voice therapy. On April 7, 2009, Plaintiff met with Sue Legacy and Lori 
Young, a Human Resources Specialist, and was told, once again, that Butler VAMC would not 
pay for speech therapy, but that Young would discuss the possibility that therapy could take 
place at Butler VMAC. Plaintiff met with Ms. Dominski on April 13, 2009, and was told that 
she would be medically terminated as of April 17, 2009. Plaintiff submitted her Application for 
Immediate Retirement on that day, with May 1, 2009, as her date of final separation.
Plaintiff testified that she had requested a meeting with the Director, Ms. Nealon, but that 
she was first required to meet with Mr. Cotter, and that he wanted the meeting to include Ms.
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Dominski and Mr. George. Plaintiff requested the meeting even though she had already 
submitted her retirement paperwork. Doc. No. 28-1, Plaintiff’s Deposition, pp. 74, 76, 111. 
Plaintiff’s meeting with Messrs. Cotter and George and Ms. Dominski allegedly took place on 
April 16, 2009. Plaintiff testified that, at that meeting, she “asked three main questions, and the 
one question was because the doctor did not determine whether I was fit for duty or not, what 
doctor made that determination, and Michele [Dominski] said, ‘No doctor made that 
determination, I made that determination.’” According to Plaintiff, Ms. Dominski explained that 
she made the determination because Plaintiff refused to attend voice therapy unless the VA paid 
for it, or Plaintiff was permitted to have it at the Butler VAMC. Id. at pp. 74-75.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment may only be granted where the moving party shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that a judgment as a matter of law is warranted. Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must enter summary 
judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential 
to his or her case, and on which he or she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In evaluating the evidence, 
the Court must interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all 
reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Watson v. Abington Township, 478 F.3d 144, 147 (3d 
Cir.2007). The burden is initially on the moving party to demonstrate that the record evidence 
does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas 
Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir.2004). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable trier of fact could render a finding in favor of the nonmoving party. McGreevy v.
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Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir.2005). When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof 
at trial, the moving party may meet its burden by showing that the admissible record evidence 
would be insufficient to carry the nonmoving party's burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 
322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party, who must go beyond his or her pleadings and designate specific facts by the 
use of affidavits, depositions, admissions or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party cannot 
defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment by simply reasserting unsupported factual 
allegations set forth in pleadings. Williams v. Borough o f West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d 
Cir.1989).
Analysis
Generally speaking, Plaintiff argues that she was constructively discharged due to her 
disability. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that Plaintiff was not terminated, and that she 
voluntarily chose to retire effective May 1, 2009. Defendant presents a somewhat layered 
argument that: 1) Plaintiff has not properly brought a claim premised upon an actual disability 
under the Rehabilitation Act; 2) that Plaintiff cannot establish aprimafacie case of 
discrimination resulting from having been perceived to be disabled; and, 3) that, even assuming 
that Plaintiff did successfully establish a prima facie case, the VA has established a legitimate 
and non-discriminatory reason for its actions, and that Plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence 
that such reasoning was pretext for discriminatory animus. See generally Doc. No. 30.
“The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination based on disability by Government 
agencies.” Kondas v. Potter, 328 F. App'x 116, 119 - 120 (3d Cir.2008)(citing 29 U.S.C. §
8
794(a)).1 In McDonald v. Com. o f Pa., Dep't o f Public Welfare, Polk Center, 62 F.3d 92 (3d 
Cir.1995), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit acknowledged that “[w]hether a suit is filed 
under the Rehabilitation Act or under the [ADA], the substantive standards for determining 
liability are the same.” Id. at 95 (citing Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir.1995)). As 
such, courts analyze a plaintiff’s discrimination claims according to the familiar burden shifting 
approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 
(1973). See Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir.2000) (“parties' burdens in 
establishing and defending claims” for discrimination are determined by procedure set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green). “Under this approach, the plaintiff must first establish a 
prima facie case. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. If the defendant does so, the presumption of 
intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prevail by showing that the 
employer's proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.” James v. Sutliff Saturn, Inc., 
10-4742, slip op., at *4 (3d Cir. Mar. 15, 2012). On summary judgment, Plaintiff may meet her 
burden by “providing evidence that would allow a fact finder reasonably to (1) disbelieve the 
employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason 
was more likely than not the motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.” See id. 
at 4-5 (citing Sarullo v. United States Postal Service, 352 F.3d 789, 799-800 (3d Cir.2003) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted)).
The Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or 
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.” 29 
U.S.C. § 794(a).
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To establish aprima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, “a plaintiff must show 
(1) that [she] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that [she] is otherwise qualified for 
the job, with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) that [she] was subjected to an 
adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 
602 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir.2010) (citing Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d 
Cir.1999)). The Rehabilitation Act defines an “individual with a disability” as someone “who 
(1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits his/her major life activities; (2) 
has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.” Kania v. 
Potter, 358 Fed. Appx. 338, 342 (3d Cir.2009) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(1)). A “substantial limitation” is a “significant restriction on a major life activity ‘as 
compared to ... the average person in the general population.’” Id. (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., 
Ky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195-96, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002)) (internal 
citation omitted). A major life activity is one that is “of central importance to daily life,” 
Williams, 524 U.S. at 197, such as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub.L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008), effective on January 1, 2009, applies to this case because Plaintiff retired on May 1,
2009. The amendments broadened the scope of the ADA by expanding the definition of 
disability, which had been narrowed by Supreme Court interpretation. See id. (finding that 
Supreme Court precedent, such as Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122
S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002), and regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission had narrowed the definition of disability in a manner inconsistent with 
congressional intent). With the passage of the ADAAA, Congress expanded the statute's non­
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exhaustive list of “major life activities” and declared that “[t]he definition of disability shall be 
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent 
permitted by the terms of this Act.” Pub.L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(b)(1)-(6), 3(2)(a), § 4(a), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3555. Major life activities include “performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, 
sleeping, ... lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, 
communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the ADAAA requires a “less searching analysis” of whether a plaintiff is 
“substantially limited.” Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10-861, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24039, at *17, 
2012 WL 604169 (W.D.Pa. Feb. 24, 2012). The EEOC has noted that under the ADAAA, 
“substantially limits” is “not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) and 
(iii). “Rather, ‘the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity requires an individualized assessment,’ and should ‘require a degree of functional 
limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits' applied prior to the ADAAA.’” 
Cohen v. CHLN, Inc., No. 10-514, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75404, at *20, 2011 WL 2713737 
(E.D.Pa. July 13, 2011). Ultimately, whether an individual is substantially limited as to a major 
life activity is a question of fact. Williams, 380 F.3d at 763.
A. “Actual Disability” v “Regarded as Disabled”
At the outset, the Court must address Defendant’s argument as to the precise nature of 
Plaintiff’s claim. More specifically, Defendant moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff to 
the extent that Plaintiff attempts to advance a claim that she suffered discrimination based upon 
an “actual” disability, as opposed to simply being “regarded as” disabled. This distinction is 
important because as part of the amendments to the ADA, claims based on a failure to 
accommodate can only be brought as part of an actual disability claim. The ADAAA
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specifically provides that an employer is not required to accommodate employees who are 
merely regarded as disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h). Plaintiff responds that her claim for 
discrimination based upon an actual disability is properly before the Court, and that summary 
judgment should not be entered in that respect. After consideration of the filings of record, the 
Court agrees with Plaintiff.
Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s “actual disability” claim on two procedural bases, 
beginning with the question of whether Plaintiff has satisfied a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
pursue such a claim. The Court notes that Defendant does not dispute the physical limitations 
alleged by Plaintiff, or that she suffered from vocal cord edema brought about by mercury 
toxicity. Likewise, Defendant does not dispute that the vocal cord edema began in October 2008 
and continued to June 2009, or that speaking is a major life activity. As such, Defendant’s effort 
to draw a distinction regarding whether Plaintiff is proceeding under a theory of actual disability, 
as opposed to being regarded as disabled, is not an effort to factually challenge Plaintiff’s 
condition, but to legally frame Plaintiff’s claim in such a way that the government can seek to 
have summary judgment awarded in its favor. Plaintiff contends that she has pursued a claim of 
disability discrimination from the outset, both before the EEOC as well as in this civil action.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A federal employee seeking relief under the Rehabilitation Act must exhaust 
administrative remedies through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
prior to filing suit. Freed v. Consol. Rail Corp., 201 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2000). A claimant 
must first attempt to informally resolve the discrimination charge by consulting with an Equal 
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor within forty-five (45) days of the alleged 
discriminatory conduct. Dalzell v. Astrue, No. 05-755, 2008 WL 598307, at * 3 (W.D.Pa. Mar.
12
3, 2008) (Cercone, J.); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). If the matter cannot be resolved informally, 
a complaint must be filed with the agency within fifteen (15) days of receiving notice that the 
EEO counselor cannot resolve the matter. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106. The EEOC then investigates 
the discrimination claim and issues a final agency decision. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.108, 1614.109, 
1614.109 and 1614.110. Thereafter, the employee may either appeal to the EEOC, 29 C.F.R. § 
1614.401, or file a civil action in federal court within ninety (90) days of receiving the final 
agency decision. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407. As a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court, a 
plaintiff must receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (l); Burgh v. 
Borough Council o f Borough o f Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir.2001) (in Title VII 
context).
“Courts have generally determined that the parameters of the civil action in the district 
court are defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to 
grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F2d 394, 
398-99 (3d Cir. 1976)(quoting Gamble v. Birmingham SouthernR.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 
1975); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970)). This civil action arose 
from Plaintiff’s administrative claim filed June 10, 2009, with the VA’s Office of Resolution 
Management (“ORM”) in case No. 200H-0259-2009102947. Doc. No. 28-5, ORM Complaint. 
Plaintiff’s ORM Complaint of Employment Discrimination alleged the following basis for her 
claims of discrimination, “Perceived Disability Regarded As/ & Age -  56.” Id. at § 7 (emphasis 
added). Plaintiff’s alleged the following description of her claims, “On May 1, 2009, I was 
forced to retire due to employer regarding me as disabled & due to my age 56.” Id. at § 8 
(emphasis added). The ORM accepted the following claim: in case number 200H-0529- 
2009102947, “Whether on the basis of age (over 40) and disability (perceived), you were
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discriminated against with respect to constructive retirement when: On May 1, 2009, you felt 
compelled to retire from your Registered Nurse, VN-2 position.” Doc. No. 28-6, Plaintiff’s 
ORM Affidavit. The ORM Affidavit contained the following questions that were completed by 
Plaintiff with handwritten responses directly on the form:
4. Do you claim to have a disability? No If so, please state the medical term 
for your medical condition or explain the nature of your condition and answer the 
following:
5. Is your medical condition permanent or temporary? If temporary, what is
the duration of your condition? Temporary - Oct 16, 2 008 - June
1, 2009
6. Does your medical condition substantially impair any of the following 
major life activities (i.e., caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, or working)? If so, what and how 
does it affect you at home and work? During period # 5above 
[performing manual tasks, speaking, breathing, and 
working] were a problem
7. Was management aware of your impairment? Yes If so, how and when 
were they made aware? Please be specific. Oct 2008/ Nevada Legacy - 
you could hear it just from hearing me try to speak.
8. Explain why you believe you were regarded as having a disability.
Because mgmt did not want to help only get rid of me.
9. Did you provide management documentation of your medical condition?
Yes
10. What accommodation, if any, did you require to do your job? Time off 
Please attach documentation. 3 Drs
11. Did you request accommodations for your condition with management?
Yes If so, please explain to whom you made the request, when it was requested, 
how it was requested, and what was requested. Michele Dominski HR
12. What was Management’s response/action pertaining to your request? No 
help Who responded and when did they respond to your request? Michelle 
Dominski, Nevada Legacy, Doug George, Lori Young
14
13. Were you offered an accommodation? No If so, explain who made the 
offer and the nature of the offered accommodation.
Id. Defendant highlights Plaintiffs own language for the proposition that a claim of
discrimination based upon an actual disability was not included in her agency complaint of
discrimination. See Doc. No. 30 at 6 -  7. In sum, Defendant’s position in this regard is that
“never during the administrative case did plaintiff assert -  at any point -  that she was
discriminated against based on an actual disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).” Id.
In response, Plaintiff notes that notwithstanding that particular instances in which she
invoked language of being perceived to be (or regarded as) disabled, a claim of discrimination
based upon an actual disability was within the scope of the EEO’s investigation. See Doc. No.
34. To that end, Plaintiff notes that the ORM affidavit specifically referenced her condition as
purportedly limiting her in major life activities, specifically activities such as “performing
manual tasks”, “speaking”, “breathing”, and “working” (see Doc. No. 28-6 at ^ 6), and that, at
the conclusion of its investigation, ORM ultimately found that Plaintiff’s vocal cord edema
substantially limited her in the major life activity of speaking such that Plaintiff had a disability
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act (Doc. No. 37-7, ORM Final Agency Decision). In
addition, Plaintiff’s claim of an actual disability was specifically included throughout the
agency’s analysis of her claims. Id. For Defendant to now argue that Plaintiff’s claim of having
an actual disability was not included within the scope of the EEO investigation essentially based
upon selective identification of handwritten responses on two different forms, responses that are
tempered by other responses in those same documents, myopically overlooks both the entire
record as well as the legal standard for such a determination. Defendant’s motion for summary
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judgment on Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim for “actual disability” based on her purported 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, will be denied.
2. Claim of Actual Disability in the Amended Complaint 
The Court turns to the language in the Amended Complaint in order to consider 
Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff abandoned her claim for actual disability discrimination. 
Plaintiff contends that the following allegations of the Amended Complaint are consistent only 
with a claim of actual disability:
9. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff has suffered from Vocal Cord 
Edema, a condition which renders speaking difficult and painful when it is active, 
as well as fibromyalgia and neck and back diseases. When the condition(s) 
becomes active, it varies in severity and duration.
10. When the condition(s) is active, Plaintiff is substantially limited in the 
major life activity of speaking and/or working, and/or walking/sleeping, and thus 
has a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.
11. Beginning in October 2008, Plaintiff experienced her most recent active 
period of Vocal Cord Edema. There were also flareups of the other illnesses.
12. Because the Clinical Application Coordinator involves training new 
employees, it requires a great deal of speaking.
13. Accordingly, Plaintiff contacted both her immediate supervisor and 
Human Resources to request a transfer to a position which would not require a 
great deal of speaking for the duration of the period that her condition was active. 
Plaintiff supported this request with medical documentation that clearly supported 
this request with medical documentation that clearly stated the nature of her 
condition, its unknown duration, and that speaking would cause Plaintiff pain.
Doc. No. 15, Am. Compl. Plaintiff contends that such averments are consistent only with a
claim of actual disability.
Once again, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that a claim of actual disability is properly 
before it, and that Plaintiff will not be limited to pursuing a claim of being simply “regarded as” 
disabled. Defendant’s attempt to distinguish between being regard as disabled and actually being
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disabled is misplaced. The definitions are not mutually exclusive. “An individual is disabled if 
he has ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual.’” Sulima, 602 F.3d at 185 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). 
Additionally, people who have a record of such impairments or are regarded as having such 
impairments also fit the definition of being “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B) and (C). While 
the “regarded as” aspect of the definition expands the range of persons covered under the statute, 
it does not require an either/or determination. In fact, such an analysis would invert the priorities 
of the statute itself, something that the ADAAA sought to correct. The primary object of 
attention of the ADA and, by extension the Rehabilitation Act, is whether the employer has 
complied with its obligations not to discriminate, as opposed to the disability determination 
itself. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App., Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act; see also, School Board o f Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 
(1987)(adopting a broad view of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act). In this 
case, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has met her exhaustion of administrative remedies 
requirement, and that Defendant has had sufficient notice of the claims being asserted against it 
since the outset of the case.
B. Prima facie case
Defendant also contends that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act in that she has failed to establish that she was 
disabled, and that she was otherwise qualified for the position. As noted above, a plaintiff must 
allege that she has a physical or mental impairment. A “physical impairment” is “any 
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or 
more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
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respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genitourinary; 
hemic and lymphatic, skin; and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1).
Simply having an impairment is insufficient to render one disabled under the statute; a 
plaintiff must also show that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Chevron 
Phillips, 570 F.3d at 614, citing Toyota Motor, 534 U S. 184, 195, 122 S.Ct. 681 (2002). The 
implementing regulations in § 1630.2(i) provides a non-exhaustive list of major life activities, 
which include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and walking.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); id. Moreover, “to be substantially 
limited means to be unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general 
population can perform or to be significantly restricted in the ability to perform it.” Id., citing 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). In deciding whether a person is “substantially limited in a major life activity, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) advised that courts should consider: 
‘(i) the nature and severity of the impairment, (ii) the duration or expected duration of the 
impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term 
impact of or resulting from the impairment.’” Id. at 614-15, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). 
“[W]hether an individual is disabled under the ADA ... remains an individualized inquiry.” Id. at 
620.
The fact that the periods during which an episodic impairment is active and substantially 
limits a major life activity may be brief or occur infrequently is no longer relevant to determining 
whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) 
states: “An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially 
limit a major life activity when active.” The legislative history of the ADAAA provides: “This 
... rule of construction thus rejects the reasoning of the courts in cases like Toddv. Academy
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Corp. [57 F.Supp.2d 448, 453 (S.D. Tex. 1999)] where the court found that the plaintiff’s 
epilepsy, which resulted in short seizures during which the plaintiff was unable to speak and 
experienced tremors, was not sufficiently limiting, at least in part because those seizures 
occurred episodically. It similarly rejects the results reached in cases [such as Pimental v. 
Dartmouth-Hichock Clinic, 236 F.Supp.2d 177, 182-83 (D. NH 2002)] where the courts have 
discounted the impact of the impairment [such as cancer] that may be in remission as too short­
lived to be substantially limiting. It is thus expected that individuals with impairments that are 
episodic or in remission (e.g., epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, cancer) will be able to establish 
coverage if, when active, the impairment or the manner in which it manifests (e.g., seizures) 
substantially limits a major life activity.” 2008 House Judiciary Committee Report at 19-20.
Here, the Court has no difficulty determining that Plaintiff’s evidence as to whether she 
was disabled is adequate to present a genuine issue for trial. The record includes evidence of a 
medical condition affecting her ability to speak sufficient to withstand summary judgment as to 
the first prong of herprimafacie case.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to show that she is qualified to perform the 
essential functions of the position. For the purpose of establishing the second prong of the prima 
facie case, the ADA defines “qualified individual” as one who, “with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such 
individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Reasonable accommodations are defined by 
the ADA regulations as:
Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or 
circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, 
that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential 
functions of that position[.]
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29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). Such modifications may include “appropriate adjustment or 
modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies ... and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). The ADA's 
regulations state that: “To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be 
necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee] in 
need of accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the 
disability and the potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). Similarly, the EEOC's interpretive guidelines provide that: “Once a 
qualified individual with a disability has requested provision of a reasonable accommodation, the 
employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation. The 
appropriate reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process 
that involves both the employer and the [employee] with a disability.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.
§ 1630.9 at 359.
As to the VA’s actions under this requirement, Defendant argues that Plaintiff never 
requested an accommodation in writing, and therefore, it was under no obligation to engage in 
the interactive process. As Plaintiff correctly points out in response, “requests for reasonable 
accommodation do not need to be in writing ... [T]o request accommodation, an individual may 
use ‘plain English’ and need not mention the ADA or use the phrase ‘reasonable 
accommodation.’” Doc. No. 34 at 16 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville School District, 174 F.3d 
142, 158 (3d Cir. 1999)). The notice merely “must make clear that the employee wants 
assistance for his or her disability. In other words, the employer must know of both the disability 
and the employee’s desire for accommodation for that disability.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 174 F.3d 
at 158-59).
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The Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the essential 
functions of the position at issue and whether plaintiff can perform them with reasonable 
accommodation(s). Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff’s position required what may amount 
to a significant amount of speaking, the evidentiary record includes Plaintiff’s request to use her 
electrolarynx. Defendant’s response thereto presents a genuine issue of material fact over 
whether Plaintiff has established aprimafacie showing of discrimination.
C. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason and Pretext
Defendant contends that it has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
actions, and that Plaintiff has adduced no evidence to show that such a reason was pretext for
actual discrimination. Defendant’s argument is relatively straightforward, and rests upon
Plaintiff’s refusal to undergo voice therapy as follows:
Even assuming that plaintiff was constructively discharged from the Butler 
VAMC -  which defendant adamantly denies -  the VA took the actions it did 
because plaintiff refused to undergo voice therapy. Because plaintiff refused the 
recommended treatment for her voice loss, no determination could be made 
whether she was fit to perform her duties as a CAC. (Letter from Dr. Krishna 
dated April 6, 2009 (Ex. 11)(stating that plaintiff “is unchanged because she was 
unable to start [voice] therapy, and until that is begun, I can make no 
determination about her fitness to return to work.”); (Dominski ORM Affidavit, p.
3 (Ex. 8)(explaining that plaintiff was told that the VA would reassess the 
situation after her follow-up appointment on April 6, 2009)). As previously 
discussed, plaintiff did not perform the duties of a CAC at any time from when 
she assumed the position until her retirement effective May 1, 2009. As such, the 
VA has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
Doc. No. 30 at 16.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, points to evidence in the record that she requested to use her 
electrolarynx, and that the request was refused without justification. She was then ordered to 
undergo a fitness for duty examination. Plaintiff notes that:
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Although Plaintiff informed the doctors conducting that exam of her successful 
past use of the electrolarynx, this was taken into account. Instead the doctors 
seemed to equate fitness for duty with the complete recovery of Plaintiff’s voice.
The doctors also ordered treatment that had been ineffective in the past despite 
being conducted over a far longer period than that contemplated by the 
recommending doctor. The VA refused to pay or make any other provision to 
assist Plaintiff in receiving the treatment that had proven to be ineffective. When 
Plaintiff returned from sick leave, she was removed from the CAC position 
without being given the opportunity to try to perform the essential functions of 
that position. She was subsequently informed that she would be medically 
terminated due to her “refusal” to undergo treatment that she had every reason to 
believe wouldn’t help. To protect her pension, Plaintiff offered to retire instead, 
an offer that the Defendant accepted.
Doc. No. 34 at 22.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained the analysis of a 
motion for summary judgment with regard to an employment discrimination claim at this stage 
of a proceeding:
To defeat a summary judgment motion based on a defendant’s proffer of a 
nondiscriminatory reason, a plaintiff who has made a prima facie showing of 
discrimination need only point to evidence establishing a reasonable inference 
that the employer’s proffered explanation is not worthy of credence ... A plaintiff 
is not required to produce evidence which necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
the employer did not act for nondiscriminatory reasons.
Semper v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724. 728 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159, 115
S.Ct. 2611 (1995).
“[A]n employer commits unlawful discrimination under the ADA if the employer does 
not mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability [.]” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 311. As for the process 
by which the need for an accommodation is raised and addressed, the Third Circuit has held, 
based on ADA regulations and interpretive guidelines that both the employer and employee 
“have a duty to assist in the search for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in good
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faith.” Taylor, 184 F.3d at 312 (quotingMengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 419-20 (3d 
Cir.1997)). A court must determine “whether the employee ... provide[d] the employer with 
enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of 
both the disability and desire for an accommodation.” Id. Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s 
request for use of her electrolarynx without any interactive discussion regarding accommodation, 
followed by Plaintiff’s subsequent retirement after being presented with the option of either 
seeking a disability retirement or having her employment terminated, could easily support a 
reasonable inference that the cause of Plaintiff’s retirement was discrimination.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
McVerry, J.
23
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SANDRA PEARCE-MATO,
Plaintiff,
v
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
Secretary o f the Department o f Veterans' Affairs,
Defendant.
)
)
)
) 2:10-cv-1029
)
)
)
)
)
)
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 11th day of June, 2012, in accordance with the foregoing Memorandum 
Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Doc. No. 27, is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff and Defendant shall file their respective 
Pretrial Narrative Statements on or before July 2, 2012. Supplemental Pretrial Narrative 
Statements may thereafter be filed on or before July 12, 2012.
The Court shall conduct a pretrial conference on Thursday, July 19, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. 
in Courtroom 6(c), United States Courthouse, 700 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. The 
parties, or a person with authorized authority, are directed to attend either in person or be 
available by phone.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Terrence F. McVerry________
United States District Court Judge
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cc: Neal A. Sanders, Esquire
Email: lonas@earthlink.net 
Dirk D. Beuth, Esquire 
Email: dbeuth@windstream.net
AUSA Megan E. Farrell, Esquire 
Email: megan.farrell@usdoi.gov
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